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The main industrial countries have experienced a wide range of exchange rate
arrangements in the last century, ranging between the two polar systems of ﬁxed
and ﬂexible exchange rates. The same variety of exchange rate regimes we observe
across time for an individual country also exists today across countries. It is a
well-established fact in international ﬁnance, documented by Stockman (1983)
and Mussa (1986), among others, that exchange rate regimes have non-neutral
eﬀects, as they aﬀect the behavior of the real exchange rate. The latter is much
more variable under the current managed ﬂoat than it was under Bretton Woods.
There is also overwhelming evidence that since 1973, wild swings in nominal and
real exchange rates have been highly correlated while ratios of price indices have
been rather stable. Many economists view this as evidence that price rigidities
matter and that they should be one of the basic ingredients in any theory of
international economic ﬂuctuations.1
However, as pointed out by Baxter and Stockman (1989), the puzzle is that
the statistical properties of most other macroeconomic variables have remained
very similar under the current managed ﬂoat to what they were under Bretton
Woods.2 This fact poses a serious challenge to any economic model, with or
without nominal rigidities, in which relative prices (like the real exchange rate)
play a critical role in the allocation of real quantities. One would ap r i o r iexpect
that a change in the volatility of the real exchange rate would be associated with
a change in that of other macoeconomic series. In this vein, Flood and Rose
(1995), having shown that the increase in the volatility of the nominal exchange
rate across exchange rate systems has no counterpart in that of any “traditional”
fundamental, consider that “this suggests that exchange rate models based only
on macroeconomic fundamentals are unlikely to be very successful.”
Recently, Betts and Devereux (1998) showed that the combination of ﬁrms
pricing-to-market and price rigidity in the buyers’ currency magnify the volatility
of the real and the nominal exchange rates for a given pattern of fundamental
shocks. Moreover, since these features also lead to an imperfect pass-through of
exchange rates’ movements to consumer prices, they can mitigate the eﬀects of ex-
change rate changes on equilibrium allocations, making a model with such building
1Stockman (1988) argues that equilibrium models with no price rigidity may account for the
non-neutrality of the exchange rate regime as well.
2More recently, Sopraseuth (1999) ﬁnds similar results for both the Bretton Woods era and
the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, using bootstrap techniques to test the signiﬁcance of
the change in the given statistics of interest.
2blocks potentially capable of accounting for the above stylized facts. Therefore,
in this paper, we attempt to account for the puzzle by introducing pricing-to-
market and price rigidity in a relatively standard framework. More speciﬁcally,
we quantitatively analyze the eﬀects of diﬀerent exchange rate arrangements on
business cycle properties in a two-country, two-sector, dynamic general equilib-
rium model in which some ﬁrms price-to-market and face convex price-adjustment
costs. Therefore, consistent with the growing empirical evidence, deviations from
purchasing power parity (PPP) arise from a failure of the law of one price (LOP),
in our environment. We examine a two-sector model for two reasons. The ﬁrst
relates to the evidence of a whole range of pricing behavior.3 By introducing two
sectors with diﬀerent speeds of price-adjustment, we capture this aspect of the
data and view the ﬁndings of our model as quantitatively more convincing. The
second reason is that with pricing-to-market and convex price-adjustment costs,
the level of the nominal exchange rate becomes indeterminate. With the presence
o fag o o df o rw h i c ht h eLOP holds we avoid this indeterminacy.4
In our model, we ﬁnd that the real exchange rate is clearly the variable most
aﬀected by the exchange rate regime. The variability of the real exchange rate
falls dramatically under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime relative to that when the
exchange rate ﬂoats. On the other hand, the volatility of most other variables is
practically unchanged across the two regimes. In this sense, the model is able to
account for the empirical fact that more variability in real exchange rates does
not get transmitted to other macroeconomic variables. We ﬁnd that pricing-to-
market is an important aspect of our results. Relative to the case in which ﬁrms
do not price-discriminate, local-currency pricing, under a ﬂexible exchange rate
regime, increases the volatility of the real exchange rate and decreases the volatil-
ity of net exports. Pricing-to-market weakens the expenditure switching eﬀect
monetary policy shocks bring about due to price rigidity, since movements in
nominal exchange rates are not fully passed-through to international prices. As a
result, large variations in exchange rates are not necessarily associated with large
movements in net exports. We also ﬁnd that the presence of two sectors with
diﬀerent pricing behavior can be crucial. For instance, when the relative share of
the ﬂexible-price sector is small, the variance of net exports approximately dou-
3Wynne (1994) presents a detailed discussion and analysis of the relative evidence.
4Betts and Devereux (1998) solve this problem by postulating that the prices of the pricing-
to-market ﬁrms are ﬁxed for only one period, after which they fully adjust and PPP then holds.
Since PPP determines the (long-run) level of the nominal exchange rate in this case, they can
also determine it for periods in which prices are ﬁxed solving backwards the Euler equation for
bonds.
3bles when the nominal exchange rate is allowed to ﬂoat. Allowing for a larger
ﬂexible-price sector dampens the eﬀect of the exchange rate regime on net ex-
ports at the cost, however, of generating a less variable real exchange rate. In
our model, we also decompose the variance of the real exchange rate, under each
exchange rate arrangement, into the variance of relative prices in each country
and their covariance. The higher volatility of the real exchange rate, when the
nominal exchange rate is allowed to ﬂoat, is mainly due to a fall in the covariance
of relative prices across countries. Since the variability of relative prices is approx-
imately unchanged across exchange rate regimes, so is the variability of output
and consumption.
As a ﬁnal quantitative assessment of our model, we replicated the experiment
conducted by Flood and Rose (1995) with the simulated time series from our model
economy. We ﬁnd that, as in their empirical test, the variability of (log)linear
functions of observed fundamentals (e.g. output, money supply, price levels and
interest rates) is barely aﬀected by the exchange rate regime while that of the
exchange rate increases substantially under a ﬂoat.
This paper complements recent research exploring the persistence and volatil-
ity of both nominal and real exchange rates in dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium models with nominal rigidities, e.g. Chari et al. (1998) and Kollman (1997).
While these previous papers focus on the exchange rate properties under ﬂoating
exchange rates, we direct our attention to the eﬀects of diﬀerent exchange rate
regimes on the business cycle properties of exchange rates and other macroeco-
nomic variables. In a vein close to ours, Monacelli (1998) accounts for the increase
in the variability of the real exchange rate under the current managed ﬂoat, in
a (semi)small open economy with nominal rigidities. Nevertheless, his attempt
is only partially successful at shedding some light on the puzzle. Bacchetta and
van Wincoop (1998) and Devereux and Engle (1998) study the impact of the ex-
change rate regime on macroeconomic activity looking at the impact of exchange
rate risks on trade and investment in models with imperfect pass-through. Fi-
nally, Moran (1998) studies the welfare consequence of establishing a monetary
union in a model similar to ours.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays down the structure
of the model; we then go on to discuss the model’s calibration procedure. Impulse
responses and business cycle statistics are presented in Section 4, while Section 5
replicates the Flood and Rose (1995) results; Section 6 concludes.
42. The Model
Building from the work of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995), we model a two-country
world in which each economy is composed of two sectors: one sector produces a
homogeneous good and the other sector produces a set of diﬀerentiated products.5
Speciﬁcally, the diﬀerentiated goods sector comprises a continuum of monopolistic
ﬁrms, each producing a distinct diﬀerentiated good using labor and capital. These
ﬁrms, contrary to the ﬁrms in the competitive sector, face convex price-adjustment
costs of the type analyzed in Hairault and Portier (1993). We assume that because
of barriers to trade, the monopolistic ﬁrms are able to price discriminate across
markets. The homogeneous good, which is perfectly traded in world markets, is
also produced using capital and labor. Capital and labor are mobile across sectors.
For simplicity, we assume that investment is carried out in the homogeneous good
only. To generate plausible investment volatility, we postulate a cost to adjusting
the amount of capital in a country, as in Baxter and Crucini (1993). We now
describe the model in more detail.
2.1. Preferences
A representative agent inhabits each economy. The agent maximizes his expected
















where6 CT represents the agent’s consumption of the homogeneous good, H rep-
resents the agent’s supply of labor, M
0 denotes the agent’s demand for nominal
money balances, P is the country’s price index, and Cm is an index of consumption










5The presence of a perfectly competitive sector for which the law of one price holds across
countries is a way to circumvent the indeterminacy in the level of the nominal exchange rate
that may potentially arise in models with PTM and price-adjustment costs.
6In the text, a superscript prime variable will denote a time t +1variable, whereas a vari-
able with no superscript represents a time t variable. Foreign variables will be denoted by an
asterisk. A superscript T represents the purely tradable good, while a superscript m denotes
the imperfectly competitive sector.
5where cm(j) is the agent’s consumption of diﬀerentiated good j,a tt i m et.T h e r e
is a continuum of these goods, with measure one. We assume that the home
country produces the goods in the interval [0,k], whereas foreign ﬁrms produce
goods in the interval (k,1].
The demand for the diﬀerentiated good j, obtained by maximizing the diﬀer-









h,h(j) is the home currency price of the home-produced diﬀerentiated good
(for j ∈[0,k]), pm
h,f(j) is the home currency price of a foreign-produced diﬀeren-























The production of the homogeneous and diﬀerentiated goods requires combining
















1−α 0 < α < 1,∀ j (2.6)
where A represents an economy-wide, country-speciﬁc random technology shock.8
Capital accumulation is assumed to be carried out in the homogenous good
only. In any given period, K will represent the capital stock in place in the home
country. To have realistic investment ﬂows (investment volatility tends to be too
high otherwise), we follow Baxter and Crucini (1993) and assume that the law of
motion of capital is subject to adjustment costs. The law of motion is described
by the following equation:
K
0 = ψ(I/K)K +( 1− δ)K (2.7)
7The ﬁrst subscript h in pm
h,l(j) denotes that the good is sold in the home country, while the
second subscript indicates where that good was produced.
8We also examined a version of the model with sector speciﬁcr e a ls h o c k s .T h em a i nﬁndings
of the paper were not aﬀected, however, by this diﬀerent stochastic structure.
6where δ is the depreciation rate and ψ(.) is an increasing, concave, and twice
continuously diﬀerentiable function with two properties entailing no adjustment
costs in steady state: ψ(δ)=δ and ψ
0(δ)=1 .
2.3. The Firm in the Purely Tradable Good Sector

















where P T,R T, and WT denote the nominal price of the purely tradable good,
the rental rate of capital, and the nominal wage rate in the purely tradable good
sector.























2.4. Firms in the Pricing to Market Sector
We assume that ﬁrms in the PTM sector face a price-adjustment cost: when the
firm decides to change the price it sets in the home (foreign) country, it must
purchase an amount µm
h (j)( µm
f (j)) of the homogenous good. The adjustment
























The convex price-adjustment cost could be thought of as being due to customer
loyalty in the presence of imperfect information (Okun (1980)). For instance,
suppose consumers have imperfect information about the distribution of prices
and that this information is costly to acquire. In such an environment, ﬁrms may
prefer to make frequent small price changes rather than sporadic large ones. On
the one hand, a ﬁrm may be unwilling to raise its price by a large amount for fear
of antagonizing consumers and inducing them to search for better price oﬀers from
its competitors. On the other hand, a ﬁrm may also be reluctant to reduce its price
7by a large amount in such an environment. The cost for consumers to look for
better prices gives an incentive to the ﬁrm to reduce its price by a smaller amount
than in a world of perfect information. Of course, very little consensus has been
reached on the form of these costs. Carlton (1986) concludes that there are many
instances of small price changes, although a whole spectrum of pricing behavior
is encountered. Kashyap (1995) reaches a similar conclusion studying data from
retail catalog prices. By having two sectors with diﬀerent price ﬂexibility, we can
c a p t u r es o m ea s p e c t so ft h e s eﬁndings.9
The (postulated) presence of trade barriers makes it possible for ﬁrms to price-
to-market, by choosing pm
h,h(j), the home-currency price they charge in the home
market, to be diﬀerent from pm
f,h(j), the foreign-currency price they charge for-
eign consumers. Speciﬁcally, due to the presence of a price-adjustment cost, ﬁrms
choose prices and inputs to maximize proﬁts solving the following dynamic pro-
































































































where s ≡ (A,A
∗,g,g ∗,PD m
t−1,PD∗m
t−1) denotes the aggregate state of the world
in period t,w i t hg (g∗) denoting the domestic (foreign) growth rate of money and
PDm (PD∗m
t−1) representing the distributions of diﬀerentiated goods’ prices in the
domestic (foreign) economy. As in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), ρ is a pricing
kernel for contingent claims.
9Woodford (1995) shows that an adjustment-cost model of price rigidity is observationally
equivalent in its implications for the aggregate price level to the Calvo (1983) setup used, for
example, in Kollman (1997).
82.5. The Household
Each period the household decides how much labor to supply to the monopolistic
sector, φH, and to the competitive sector, (1−φ)H, at the nominal wages Wm and
W T, where 0 < φ < 1. Similarly, the household supplies a fraction, ν,o fc a p i t a l
to the monopolistic sector and a fraction, (1 − ν), to the competitive sector at
the nominal rental rates Rm and RT. In addition to the factor payments, the
wealth of the household comprises the nominal money balances, M, contingent
one-period nominal bonds denominated in the home currency, B(s), which pay
one unit of home currency if state s
0
occurs and 0 otherwise, profits from the
monopolistic ﬁrms,
R k
0 Πm(j)dj, and a governmental lump-sum tax or transfer T.
The household must decide how much of its wealth to allocate to the consumption
of the homogeneous and diﬀerentiated goods and how much to invest and save




















0,s) is the price of the bond contingent on the state s
0 occurring at
















































The household’s problem can be written as the following dynamic programming
problem:
























subject to (2.21), (2.22), and the law of motion for capital given by (2.7).
2.6. Government
Each period the government makes a lump-sum transfer or collects a lump-sum












where g is a random variable.
2.7. Equilibrium
2.7.1. Deﬁnition
We focus on the equilibrium characterized by symmetry in the monopolistically
competitive sector, deﬁned as follows:
• a set of decision rules for the representative household and the foreign equiv-
alent,10 CT(Ω;s), Cm(Ω;s), B(Ω;s
0), M
0(Ω;s), h(Ω;s), I(Ω;s), K0(Ω;s),
ν(Ω;s), and φ(Ω;s), solving the household’s problem;
• a capital demand rule, Km(pm
−1h,h(j),p m
−1f,h(j);s),al a b o rd e m a n dr u l e
Hm(pm
−1h,h(j),p m







−1f,h(j);s) solving the monopolistic ﬁrm’s problem;
• a capital demand rule, KT(s) and a labor demand rule HT(s) solving the

























,s),P T(s),WT(s), RT(s), W m(s),a n dRm(s) are such that the goods,
money, bonds, and input markets clear.











10In order to save on notation the foreign conditions are not shown.
10Because some ﬁrms price-discriminate across countries, changes in the real ex-
change rate come from movements in the deviations from the LOP for monopo-
listic goods.





























































































where Ui and Vi represent the partial derivative of the utility function and the value
function with respect to their ith argument, and χ is the multiplier associated
with the capital evolution equation (2.7). S(s
0,s) denotes the transition function
governing the state of the world. It gives the probability of state s
0 occurring at
time t +1 , given that the world is in state s at time t.
11Firms Similarly, the problem of the monopolistic ﬁrm yields the following con-
ditions:
ρW


































































































where η is the multiplier related to the distribution of output across home and
foreign markets (2.18), and ϕi is the partial derivative of the cost function with
respect to its ith argument.
Conditions (2.38) and (2.39) are the standard conditions stipulating that the
ﬁrm hires labor and capital until the marginal revenue of hiring one more unit
equals its marginal cost. Equations (2.40) and (2.41) indicate that the ﬁrm selects
prices pm
h,h(j) and pm
f,h(j) so that the marginal beneﬁto fr a i s i n gap r i c ee q u a l st h e















































































By raising its price, the monopolistic ﬁrm beneﬁts from the higher value of its
output but bears the current and future costs of changing its price, as well as a
lower current demand for its product.
3. Calibration






















 + υ ln(1 − H). (3.1)
The interest elasticity of money demand, σ, is known to be small but positive. We
use Ireland’s (1997) estimate and set it equal to 0.159. υ is calibrated such that
the agent spends 30 percent of his time working in steady state. Since we are not
aware of any satisfactory way to pin down ω, the relative share of the ﬂexible-price,
competitive good on steady state consumption, as a natural benchmark value we
set this parameter to 0.5, middle ground between complete price stickiness and
perfect price ﬂexibility.11 We set the discount factor to 0.9901, which implies a
quarterly real interest rate of 1 percent.
Production We set θ=6.17. This gives a value of 1.19 for the steady state
markup, which is the value estimated by Morrison (1990). This value is standard
in the literature.












Therefore, there are costs to adjusting prices in steady state as in Ireland (1997)
and Aiyagari and Braun (1997). Following the latter, we use empirical results from
11In section 4.2.2 we analyze the implications of diﬀerent values of this parameter.
13the VAR literature to calibrate the adjustment cost parameter, d.W e c h o o s e d
such that the maximal response of employment to a one-standard-deviation im-
pulse to the growth rate of money is the same as that reported by Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996). Using a nonstructural VAR in which monetary
shocks are identiﬁed by innovations to nonborrowed reserves, they ﬁnd that a con-
tractionary one-standard-deviation monetary innovation leads to a 0.149 percent
decline in employment. This yields a value of the adjustment-cost parameter, d,
equal to 6, which implies that, in steady state, the economies spend 0.1% of world
output adjusting prices.
Since all the goods are traded, we used Stockman and Tesar’s (1995) estimate
of the labor share in the production of tradable goods and set (1−γ) and (1−α)
to 0.61.




= λ1+λ2z + ²
0
(3.3)
where z ≡ (z,z∗)
0
, ² ≡ (²,²∗)
0
and λ1 is a vector of constants and λ2 is a matrix
of coeﬀicients. We compute the Solow residuals from aggregate quarterly data
on output and employment for the U.S. and Germany, taken from the Federal
Reserve System database, for the period 1973:1-1998:3 (i.e., the ﬂoating period).
As is standard in the literature, the Solow residuals are constructed as log y-
(1 − 0.39)logn, without including a measure of the capital stock. We used data
on civilian employment instead of hours worked, since Germany does not compile







The standard deviations of the U.S. and German productivity shocks are
0.0037 and 0.0067, respectively, and the correlation between the innovations is
0.028.12
12These values are on the lower side with respect to those usually assumed in the literature.
For instance, Backus et al. (1995) set the standard deviation of productivity shocks in both
the home and the foreign country, and their cross-correlation to 0.00852 and 0.258 respectively.
Our choice aﬀects the absolute level of volatility of real variables in our model, as shown in
the following section. However, since our main focus is on relative volatility across regimes,
adopting the above mentioned values would not change our main results.
14Monetary Shocks We assume that the monetary growth rates in the two coun-
tries follow two independent autoregressive processes. We assume independence
because monetary innovations are not highly correlated across countries. We es-
timate the following process for the U.S. and Germany using quarterly data on
M1 for the (ﬂoating) period 1973:1-1998:3
logg
0




0 is a normally distributed error term with a standard deviation σu. For the
U.S., we obtain the following, rather standard, estimates: ρg =0 .544, g =1 .0142,
and σu =0 .007.13 In contrast, the estimation on German data yielded ρg =0 .445,
g =1 .0189, and σu =0 .008.
4. Findings
We now assess the business cycle properties of our model economy under the two
diﬀerent exchange rate regimes by studying the eﬀects of both real and monetary
shocks. We begin by computing impulse-response functions to grasp some intu-
ition on the working of our two-sector, two-country model; subsequently, in the
spirit of the equilibrium business cycle literature, we analyze the second moment
properties of the model, focusing on the diﬀerence in the volatility of key vari-
ables across exchange rate regimes. Throughout all the exercises but the last one,
we deﬁne the ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ea st h eo n ei nw h i c ht h ef o r e i g nc o u n t r y
(credibly) pegs its currency to that of the home country.
4.1. Impulse Responses
The impulse-response experiments consist of shocking the driving process once at
date 0, when both countries are at their deterministic steady state. We discuss
first responses of the home and foreign economies to an unexpected increase in
the home growth rate of money (equivalent to a permanent unexpected increase
in the home money stock), followed by an investigation of the responses to an
unexpected positive aggregate real shock to the home country.
Monetary Shock Figures 1a and 1b depict the responses, under each exchange
rate regime, of key variables in each country (aggregate, tradable and PTM out-
put, aggregate consumption, labor supply, relative price of PTM goods, inﬂation,
13Cooley and Hansen (1995) set the value of ρ and σ to 0.5 and 0.01, respectively.
15and the nominal interest rate), as well as the nominal and the real exchange rate,
to a one standard deviation shock to the growth rate of money (amounting to an
increase of 0.6 percentage point). In all ﬁgures, the solid line corresponds to the
peg and the dashed line corresponds to the ﬂexible exchange rate regime. While
the initial shock is unanticipated, the future path of the money stock is known with
certainty by households, because money growth follows a known autoregressive
law of motion. This means that in our model, as we mentioned above, monetary
policy has real eﬀects even when anticipated. On impact, because of the presence
of the price-adjustment cost, the home nominal price of monopolistic goods reacts
less than the nominal price of the perfectly competitive good, making the mark
up and relative price of the former fall. As a consequence, households choose to
substitute out of the competitive good into home and foreign PTM goods, since
the two commodities are fairly good substitutes (the elasticity of substitution is
unity in our baseline Cobb-Douglas utility), thus shifting the factors of production
toward these goods in both countries. The production of monopolistic goods in-
creases while that of competitive goods shrinks; at the aggregate level both home
output and home consumption rise. The increase in consumption is due to a fall
in the real interest rate, although the nominal interest rate slightly rises, following
t h ej u m pi ne x p e c t e di n ﬂation. In subsequent periods, the anticipated inﬂation
eﬀect brings about an increase in the real rate, depressing consumption. Invest-
ment falls on impact, and the aggregate capital stock in the following periods
declines because of the assumption that capital is a ﬂexible price good. In our
model, price stickiness, as already pointed out by Ohanian, Stockman, and Kilian
(1995), imposes only an intratemporal distortion without aﬀecting the intertem-
poral choice between consumption today and tomorrow, as would be the case if
capital were a sticky price good, as in standard one-sector models with nominal
rigidities (e.g., Kim (1995)).
As we anticipated beforehand, with pricing-to-market and perfect capital mo-
bility (complete asset markets), a ﬂoating exchange rate does not perfectly insulate
the foreign country from the monetary shock occurring in the home country. In-
deed, home demand for the foreign produced monopolistic goods increases too.
This triggers an increase in labor supply in the foreign country in order to meet
world demand, as well as a shift of resources from the competitive to the monop-
olistic sector. The foreign agent has to produce more while consuming roughly
the same: nominal and real interest rates are barely aﬀected. As a consequence,
aggregate consumption displays little correlation across countries, while as in the
home country, the aggregate level of output rises in the foreign country. The de-
16crease in world production of perfectly traded commodities also puts downward
pressure on the foreign relative price of PTM goods, though to a much lesser
extent than in the home country. Following the monetary shock both the real and
nominal exchange rates depreciate. The persistence of the nominal exchange rate
movements closely mimics the persistence of the monetary shock, since the nomi-
nal exchange rate is determined by the LOP in the ﬂexible-price sector. However,
t h ep e r s i s t e n c eo ft h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ei ss i g n i ﬁcantly higher. The real exchange
rate response to a monetary shock has a half-life of about seven quarters, slightly
lower than what is found empirically.
Under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, the propagation of the monetary shock
is quite diﬀerent. Since its currency is pegged, the foreign monetary authority
has to increase the rate of money growth following a monetary expansion in the
home country. Thus it imports the home monetary policy and now behaves iden-
tically like the home economy. The responses of all variables in both countries
are generally larger in absolute value under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, with
the exception of the real exchange rate. This result does not seem to support the
Mundell-Fleming view that ﬁxed exchange rates are preferable (in the sense that
output is less volatile) when the source of the shocks is mainly monetary.14
Real Shock In contrast to monetary shocks, the transmission of economy-wide,
country-speciﬁc real shocks is practically the same under either a ﬁxed or a ﬂexible
exchange rate regime, as in this case the full insurance mechanism that complete
markets entail is at work. The impulse-responses are presented in Figures 2a and
2b. Following a positive shock to home aggregate productivity, the inﬂation rate
falls on impact in both countries.15 T h er e l a t i v ep r i c eo fm o n o p o l i s t i cg o o d sr i s e s
in the two countries as a result of the price-adjustment cost borne by ﬁrms in this
sector. Consequently, the world consumption of PTM goods falls on impact.16
The foreign production of tradable goods falls on impact as the foreign agent
w o r k sl e s s( t h i se ﬀect is again due to complete markets) and continues decreasing
as investment (not shown) ﬂows toward the home country. In the aggregate,
consumption in the two countries increases, whereas home output increases and
the foreign output falls. Under ﬂoating exchange rates, both the nominal and the
14In terms of utility, however, the welfare beneﬁto faﬁxed exchange rate system can be quite
diﬀerent.
15For simplicity, we assume the real shocks to be uncorrelated across countries for this exper-
iment.
16The response of tradable consumption is not shown, but it obviously increases.
17real exchange rates appreciate on impact following the real shock, although the
magnitude of the appreciations is quite small. The real appreciation is the result
of the fall in the foreign relative price of monopolistic goods relative to the home
one.
It is interesting to note that the ﬁxed exchange rate regime brings about a
decrease in the volatility of the real exchange rate, with all the other variables
reacting in the same way as under a ﬂoat. Under a real shock, the exchange
rate regime does not provide a way of shielding from its consequences, mainly
aﬀecting the real exchange rate response. As we just pointed out, this is in
contrast to monetary shocks, in which case a ﬁxed exchange rate regime ampliﬁes
the response of most variables, except that of the real exchange rate. However,
it is still possible that the exchange rate regime aﬀects mainly the real exchange
rate when an economy is hit by a combination of both real and monetary shocks.
We turn to this question in the next section in which we quantiﬁes the impact
of the exchange rate regime on the volatility and the persistence of the principal
macroeconomic variables in our model.
4.2. Business Cycle Properties
As we mentioned earlier, Stockman (1983), Mussa (1986), Baxter and Stockman
(1989), and Flood and Rose (1995) ﬁnd that most variables have approximately
the same statistical properties under either Bretton Woods or the current ﬂoating
exchange rate system. The one exception is the real exchange rate. This ﬁnding
is at odds with the received view that the decrease in the volatility of the real ex-
change rate brought about by ﬁxed exchange rates should be reﬂe c t e di ni n c r e a s e s
in the volatilities of other macroeconomic variables. This section ﬁrst quantiﬁes
the eﬀect of a change in the exchange rate arrangement on the statistical proper-
ties of key macroeconomic variables in the model. We compute all the statistics by
logging and ﬁltering the data using the Hodrick and Prescott ﬁlter and averaging
moments across 100 simulations, each running for as many periods as the actual
ﬁxed and ﬂoating historical periods (i.e., 52 and 116 quarters respectively).
To give a simple idea of the extent of the puzzle, Table 1 reports the aver-
age standard deviations of inﬂation, ouput, consumption, investment, labor, net
exports (NX) and exchange rates for the G7 countries. We report both the trade-
weighted exchange rates and the exchange rates against the dollar (z/$ and e/$).
The table clearly shows that while the real and the nominal exchange rates be-
came much more volatile in the post-Bretton Woods era, we do not observe a
18similar change in the volatility of the other macroeconomic variables reported in
the table. For instance, the average standard deviations of output and inﬂation
are roughly the same under the two eras. Moreover, while consumption, invest-
ment, and employment have become more volatile, on average, since 1973, this
increased volatility pales compared to the increase in the standard deviation of
the real exchange rate. Finally, the standard deviation of net exports slightly fell
after the demise of Bretton Woods.
Using our simulated data, Table 2 reports the standard deviation of the real
and nominal exchange rates, as well as that of home inflation, output,consumption,
investment, labor, and net exports. Table 3 describes the volatility of the foreign
variables under the two regimes.
Table 2 shows that the variability of output under a ﬂexible exchange rate
regime is 0.8 percent, roughly one half of the variability of the G7 average output,
while the volatility of aggregate consumption is 40 percent of that in the data,
during the ﬂexible exchange rate period. The standard deviation of investment
is 5.7 times larger than that of output, higher than what it is in the actual data.
Aggregate output in the foreign country is more volatile than in the home coun-
try, while foreign aggregate consumption is as volatile as in the home country.
Foreign aggregate output is more volatile than home aggregate output because
of the higher standard deviation of the foreign real shock, under our calibration.
Similarly, foreign investment is also more volatile than home investment. Table
3 also shows that the standard deviation of the foreign output is roughly 2/3 of
that in the data.
As we previously mentioned, both real and nominal exchange rates have been
highly volatile under the current ﬂexible exchange rate system. In fact, table
1 reports that the standard deviation of either exchange rate is approximately
between 2.5 and 4 times that of output, depending on the type of exchange rate
(trade-weighted or bilateral). Under our calibration, the model with a ﬂoating
exchange rate regime produces variability of the real and nominal exchange rates
that are 1.3 and 3.2 times the variability of home output, respectively. Therefore,
the model succeeds in generating a volatile nominal exchange rate, yet this does
not completely translate into a very large variability of the real exchange rate
relative to aggregate output.
Comparing volatilities of variables under either a ﬁxed or a ﬂexible exchange
rate regime, Tables 2 and 3 show that the real exchange rate is clearly the variable
most aﬀected by a change in regime. All other variables are barely inﬂuenced by
the change of regime, and none experienced changes in volatility as large as that of
19t h er e a le x c h a n g er a t e . 17In this sense, the model is able to account for the empirical
fact that more variability in the real exchange rate does not get transmitted to
other macroeconomic variables. We provide some intuiton behind the result in
the following section.
To gauge the contribution of monetary shocks to this ﬁnding, we computed
the same across-regime volatilities with only real shocks. Tables 4 and 5 show the
results for the home and foreign country, respectively. Now, all the variables are
less volatile than in the case in which both money and real shocks are present.
However, it remains that the variables most aﬀected by the change in the exchange
rate regime are the nominal and the real exchange rates. For instance, the real
exchange rate is twice as volatile when the nominal exchange rate ﬂoats, while
the volatility of the remaining variables (except the nominal exchange rate, of
course) are unaﬀected by the exchange rate regime. Note, also, that both exchange
rates are now much less volatile than aggregate output. This suggests monetary
shocks play an important role in determining the variability of the real exchange
rate when prices are sticky. This is in stark contrast to results found in open-
economy ﬂexible-price models. Our result is also consistent with ﬁndings in the
VAR literature measuring the eﬀects of monetary shocks in an open economy.
Both Clarida and Galì (1994) and Eichenbaum and Evans (1996), using VAR data
representations under very diﬀerent identifying assumptions, found a signiﬁcant
portion of the forecast error’s variance in exchange rates to be due to monetary
shocks.
Finally, in Table 6 we report the impact of the exchange rate arrangement
and of real and monetary shocks on the serial and cross-correlation of selected
variables. The ﬁrst three lines show the serial correlation of the real and nomi-
nal exchange rate and their cross-correlation. In our model, under a ﬂoat, both
exchange rates are less persistent than in the actual data, and monetary shocks
have a dampening impact on the persistence of the real exchange rate, reﬂecting
the fact that monetary shocks are less autocorrelated than productivity shocks.
This points to a weakness in the propagation mechanism of monetary shocks in
our model. Note also that under the ﬂexible exchange rate regime, the real and
the nominal exchange rates are highly correlated when the simulations include all
the shocks. That correlation, however, falls by approximately a half when only
17The volatility of sectoral output and consumption did not change dramatically either, across
exchange rate regime. Relative to the ﬁxed exchange rate regime, the ratios of standard devia-
tions of home tradable and nontradable consumption under the ﬂexible exchange rate arrange-
ment were 0.88 and 0.99; that of tradable and nontradable output were 0.98 and 0.7.
20real shocks are included. Again, this points to the importance of monetary shocks
in our framework.
The last four lines of Table 6 show the correlation of the real exchange rate to
the ratio of home and foreign aggregate output, the cross-country correlation of
aggregate consumption, aggregate output, and the nominal money supply. The
ﬁrst statistics is consistent with the data for the case with both real and monetary
shocks, as the real exchange rate displays basically no correlation with the ratio of
output (Stockman (1998)). The model’s consumption correlation across countries
decreases going from a ﬁxed to a ﬂexible exchange rate regime. Moreover, that
correlation is approximately zero when the exchange rate is allowed to ﬂoat in the
model and both types of shocks aﬀect the economies. This result is due to the joint
presence of monetary shocks and pricing-to-market, as was highlighted by Betts
and Devereux (1998). As could be seen from the impulse response functions, a
monetary shock, under a ﬂexible exchange rate regime, raises home consumption
while foreign consumption remains approximately unchanged. In contrast, domes-
tic and foreign consumptions move together in response to a real shock. Thus, the
presence of monetary shocks lowers the consumption correlation so much that it
is roughly zero under the ﬂexible exchange rate regime. Note, however, that the
correlation of domestic and foreign output is negative in the model. Finally, as
expected, the cross-country correlation of nominal money supply decreases under
ﬂoating exchange rates.18
4.3. Understanding the Mechanism
4.3.1. The Behavior of Relative Prices Across Countries
Why are the variances of most macroeconomic series in our model, except that of
the real exchange rate, unaﬀected by the exchange rate regime? One immediate
reason is that the change in the exchange rate system mainly impinges on the
covariance between domestic and foreign relative prices. Deﬁne q (q∗)a st h e
domestic (foreign) relative price of the imperfectly competitive goods in term of




18The cross-correlations of consumtpion and money, under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, are
much higher in the model than in the data. This can be partly due to the fact that, contrary to
our ﬁxed exchange rate regime, Bretton Woods was not a system of perfectly pegged currencies.
21Recalling that LOP holds in our model for the competitive good, the real exchange










where ω is the weight of the competitive good in the consumption aggregator.
Therefore, the variance of the logarithm of the real exchange rate can be decom-
posed in the following way:
Va r(logz)=( 1− ω)
2 [Va r(logq
∗)+Va r(logq) − 2Cov(logq
∗,logq)]. (4.3)
As the impulse-response functions documented, under a ﬂexible exchange rate
regime, the domestic and foreign relative prices are barely correlated in response
to a monetary shock and perfectly correlated in response to a real shock. Since
the foreign country imports the home monetary policy when it pegs its nomi-
nal exchange rate, relative prices become perfectly correlated in response to both
real and monetary shocks. Therefore, the covariance and the correlation of rela-
tive prices increase under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. Under a ﬁxed exchange
rate system, the covariance between domestic and foreign relative prices increases
to such an extent that the variance of the real exchange rate is approximately
zero. Table 7 presents the ratios of the standard deviation and the covariance of
domestic and foreign relative prices under the two exchange rate regimes.
The table shows that while the standard deviations of the domestic and foreign
relative price is approximately the same under the two exchange regimes, the
covariance between these two relative prices is ﬁve times higher when the nominal
exchange rate is ﬁxed. The fact that the volatility of relative prices is barely
aﬀected by the exchange rate regime explains why consumption and output are
nearly as volatile when the exchange rate is ﬁxed or not. The increase in the
covariance between domestic and foreign prices under the ﬁxed exchange rate
regime also explains why the correlation of consumption in Table 6 increases
going from a ﬂexible to a ﬁxed exchange rate.
In our framework, this change in the covariance structure between domestic
and foreign relative prices clearly points towards the advantage to adopting a
two-country general equilibrium model, as opposed to a small or semi-small open
economy in which foreign relative prices are exogenous, to study the eﬀects of
exchange rate regimes. In the latter instance, all variations in the real exchange
rate will be due to movements in domestic relative prices, because the covariance
22between domestic and foreign relative prices as well as the variance of the latter
will be zero. Since more variable domestic prices will bring about more volatile
domestic consumption through the ﬁrst-order condition for consumption, it has
to be the case that a more volatile real exchange rate in such an environment
results in an increase in the volatility of consumption. However, in a general
equilibrium context, an increase in the variability of the real exchange rate does
not necessarily have to come along with an increase in the volatility of consumption
or other macroeconomic series, as our results demonstrate.
4.3.2. The Role of Pricing-to-market and Two Sectors
Intuitively the higher volatility of the real exchange rate under the ﬂexible ex-
change rate regime should have an impact on the volatility of net exports. In
our baseline calibration, this does not happen, mainly because of the presence of
ﬁrms pricing-to-market and because of a signiﬁcant share of the competitive good.
Figures 3 and 4 shed some light on the contribution of these two features of the
model. Figure 3 shows the standard deviation of the real exchange rate relative to
output with respect to the share ω of the purely competitive, ﬂexible-price good
when monopolistic ﬁrms price-to-market or not. As Betts and Devereux (1998)
pointed out, it is apparent that local currency pricing increases the volatility of
the real exchange rate relative to that of output. It also shows that the impact of
pricing-to-market is greater the more important is the monopolistic sector. Figure
4, on the the hand, shows the standard deviation of net export under the ﬂexi-
ble exchange rate regime relative to the standard deviation of net exports when
t h ee x c h a n g er a t ei sﬁxed. This ratio is shown as function of ω, with and with-
out pricing-to-market: pricing-to-market clearly dampens this ratio. Therefore,
pricing-to-market is an important feature of the model as it increases the volatility
of the real exchange rate with respect to output and it decreases the eﬀects of that
volatility on the variability of net exports. Basically, the combination of pricing-
to-market and price rigidity in the buyer’s currency mitigates the expenditure
switching eﬀect, since movements in nominal exchange rates do not fully pass-
through to the prices consumers face. As a result, large variations in exchange
rates are not necessarily associated with large movements in net exports. The
ﬁgures show that the presence of a perfectly competitive sector is important too.
If the economies were composed solely of pricing-to-market monopolistic ﬁrms,
under a ﬂexible exchange rate regime the model would counterfactually generate
net exports almost twice as volatile as when the foreign currency is ﬁxed. In this
23case, a larger share of the home country’s exports is subject to foreign monetary
policy shocks.
5. The Flood and Rose (1995) Experiment Revisited
In this section we set out to replicate the main experiment Flood and Rose (1995)
conducted on a panel of eight OECD countries. They start with the observation
that exchange rates are signiﬁcantly more volatile under ﬂexible exchange rate
regimes than under ﬁxed ones. They also ﬁnd that the volatility of other macroe-
conomic variables does not change much across exchange arrangements. As a
result, they argue that models based on fundamentals will likely be unsuccessful
at explaining exchange rates’ movements.
Their experiment is as follows. Take a standard monetary model of exchange
rate determination, ﬁrst assuming perfectly ﬂexible prices. Using a structural
money-market equilibrium condition and PPP, the logarithm of the exchange
rate can be written as:
et =( mt − m
∗




t) − (εt − ε
∗
t) − υt (5.1)
where et is the nominal exchange rate, mt denotes the money stock, yt represents
real income, it is the nominal interest rate, and εt is a money demand shock. For-
e i g nv a r i a b l e sa r ed e n o t e dw i t ha na s t e r i s ka n dυt is a stationary random deviation
from PPP. β and α are structural parameters representing the income and interest
elasticities of money demand, respectively. Denote “traditional fundamentals” by
relative money stocks and real income across countries:
TFt ≡ (mt − m
∗
t) − β(yt − y
∗
t). (5.2)
Finally, define as “virtual fundamentals”:
VF t ≡ et − α(it − i
∗
t). (5.3)
Under the assumption of price stickiness, a similar expression relating virtual
and traditional fundamentals can be derived using a Phillips-curve equation:




















24where rt i st h ee xa n t er e a li n t e r e s tr a t ew h i l eθ and φ are parameters character-
izing the price-adjustment process. The right-hand side of the equation deﬁnes
the traditional fundamentals under price stickiness:


















As Flood and Rose (1995) stipulate, both traditional and virtual fundamentals are
two diﬀerent ways of measuring the same latent variable. Therefore, we should
expect TF t (TFSt) and VF t to behave similarly provided the model is a good
representation of the data. However, virtual and traditional fundamentals behave
very diﬀerently across exchange rate regimes. Flood and Rose (1995) show that
the volatility of virtual fundamentals is much higher under the Bretton Woods
system than under the current managed float, while that of traditional fundamen-
tals does not change significantly. To statistically test for a change in volatility
across exchange rate regimes, the authors assume that the change in traditional
and virtual fundamentals, ∆TFt (∆TFS t) and ∆VF t, are normally distributed,
so that the ratio of regime-specific sample variances is distributed as F under the
null hypothesis of equal variance across exchange rate regimes. For each deﬁnition
of fundamentals, Table 8 reports the ratio of the sample standard deviation under
ﬂoating exchange rates relative to the sample standard deviation under Bretton
Woods. In the column labeled “Data,” we report the same statistic computed
with German and U.S. quarterly data. We use data from 1960Q2 to 1972Q4 for
the Bretton Woods era and from 1973Q1 to 1998Q3 for the post-Bretton Woods
era. The table shows that while the null hypothesis of equal standard deviation
across regimes cannot be rejected at the 5 percent conﬁdence level for traditional
fundamentals (with or without price stickiness), this is not the case for virtual
fundamentals.19 The variance of virtual fundamentals increases more than three
t i m e sa c r o s sr e g i m e s .
The second and third columns of Table 8 report the results from the simulated
series of our model under all shocks and only real ones, respectively. As in Flood
and Rose (1995), we set β =1and θ = φ =0 .1.
19The critical values are 1.59 and 1.94 at the 5% and 10% conﬁdence level. In Table 8,
two asterisks indicate that the null hypothesis of equal volatility cannot be rejected at the 5%
conﬁdence level; one aterisk indicates that the hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% but not at
the 1% conﬁdence level.
25We ran the following experiment. We simulate our model under both the
ﬂexible and the ﬁxed exchange rate regime. Since under a perfect peg the volatility
of the virtual fundamentals will be exactly zero, and therefore, the ratio across
regimes will be inﬁnite, we introduce some variability in the nominal exchange
rate by adding a shock to the nominal exchange rate. We calibrate this shock so
that the standard deviation of the simulated VF under the ﬁxed exchange rate
regime is the same as that found in the data for the Breton Woods period (roughly
1%). We then endogenously derive the consistent process for the foreign growth
rate of money. Real shocks in both countries and home money supply shocks were
set to their benchmark values. Looking at column 2 for all shocks, the results in
Table 7 show that the simulated series from our model give a very similar picture
to that in the actual data. In fact, the behavior of the volatility of traditional
fundamentals across regimes is so close in our model that the null hypothesis of
equal variance would not be rejected in our simulated data. Moreover, the model
captures the increase in the variability in virtual fundamentals going from a ﬁxed
to a ﬂexible exchange rate regime: the volatility ratio of VF is 3.58 in the data
while our model generates a ratio of 3.16. The third column sheds some light
on this result: the change of regime is not able to account for the change in
volatility when there are only productivity shocks, as the ratio of volatility of the
virtual fundamentals now falls below one going from a ﬁxed to a ﬂexible exchange
rate regime. As the previous analysis of the variables’ second moments in the
model showed, monetary shocks play an important role in the dynamics of the
model, allowing the model’s implications to be closer to the data along important
dimensions.
6. Conclusions
Recently Devereux (1997), drawing together the relevant evidence from both em-
pirical and theoretical research, concluded that there is some hope for a “tradi-
tional” macroeconomic approach to the real exchange rate. Following this lead,
this paper developed a rather standard general equilibrium model, featuring de-
viations from the law of one price and nominal price rigidities. We found it
capable to go some way in accounting for both the dramatic increase in the rela-
tive volatility of the nominal and real exchange rates occurring after the demise of
the Bretton Woods system, as well as the relative stability in the volatility of most
other macroeconomic variables. One of the main mechanisms behind this result
is the combination of pricing-to-market and price rigidity in the buyer’s currency,
26as ﬂuctuations in nominal exchange rates are not fully passed-through to prices
consumers face. Consequently, large variations in exchange rates are not necessar-
ily associated with large movements in quantities. This feature is quantitatively
crucial, since it increases the volatility of the real exchange rate and decreases
that of net exports. Moreover, diﬀerent speeds of price-adjustments across sec-
tors are also important, since a world economy solely composed of monopolistic
ﬁrms pricing-to-market would counterfactually generate net exports that are sig-
niﬁcantly more volatile in a ﬂexible vis-à-vis a ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
Our ﬁndings seem to have an obvious policy implication: if there is no sig-
niﬁcant trade-oﬀ between exchange rate stability and macroeconomic volatility,
then ﬂoating exchange rates may be excessively volatile. However, in order to
make explicit policy recommendations our analysis should be extended in at least
two ways. First, a thorough assessment of the welfare impact of exchange rate
volatility should be undertaken. Second, the management of the exchange rate
implies that monetary policy has to give up on goals related to internal stabiliza-
tion. The exploration of this aspect requires that money supply be modeled in
aw a yr e ﬂecting those goals, rather than as following some exogenous stochastic
process. These are avenues we are currently pursuing.
Clearly this analysis is not devoid of problems; for example our equilibrium
model is still unable to generate an adequate persistence and absolute level of
volatility of the real exchange rate. As pointed out by Devereux (1997), one likely
reason is that there are other important goods market frictions, e.g., transport
costs (Dumas (1992)), alternative market structures (Lapham (1995)), or search
costs (Head and Shi (1996)), not included in our setup that could potentially gen-
erate more movements in real exchange rates. Finally, in our model the increase
in the variability of the real exchange rate, under a ﬂexible exchange rate regime,
is due to a fall in the covariance of within-country relative prices of goods priced-
to-market: the exchange rate regime has barely any eﬀect on the variance of these
relative prices. Therefore, providing direct evidence on the speciﬁc relationships
among exchange rate arrangements, sectoral market structure, and the properties
of relative price movements is an important task for future research.
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31Table 1. Economic Fluctuations Across Exchange Rate Regimes (in
%) - Average of G7 Countries20
Sys. St. Dev.
z e z/$ e/$ π Y C I H NX
Bretton Woods n.a. 1.90 2.74 2.25 0.70 1.81 1.22 4.10 1.62 2.77
Post Bretton Woods 7.26 7.55 5.01 4.45 0.71 1.82 1.65 4.53 2.23 2.46
20Series are quarterly, logged (with exception of net exports and inﬂation) and
passed through the HP ﬁlter. The Bretton Woods period is taken to run from
1957:1 to 1972:4 (or shorter subject to data availability); the Post Bretton Woods
from 1974:1 to 1997:4. Data were taken from the IMF International Financial
Statistics: Y is real GDP (industrial production for France); C is nominal to-
tal private consumption expenditures deﬂated using the GDP deﬂator (CPI for
France); I is change in nominal stocks deﬂated using the GDP deﬂator; H is indus-
trial employment; NX is deﬁned as in Kollman (1997), page 34; π is quarterly CPI
inﬂation; z and e are real and nominal eﬀective exchange rates computed by the
IMF (REU and NEU, respectively); e/$ and z/$ are nominal and real exchange
rates vis-á-vis the U.S. dollar (the latter based on relative CPI).
32Table 2. Simulated Second Moments of Home Variables (in %)
Sys. St. Dev.
z e π Y C I H NX
Fix 0.009 n.a 0.86 0.82 0.58 4.69 0.68 1.30
(0.0001) 0.002 (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
Float 1.04 2.54 0.80 0.80 0.66 4.59 0.65 1.10
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Table 3. Simulated Second Moments of Foreign Variables (in %)
Sys. St. Dev
π Y C I H
Fix 0.86 1.23 0.57 5.87 0.78
(0.002) (0.0063) (0.0019) (0.0059) (0.0025)
Float 0.80 1.21 0.63 5.85 0.73
(0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0018) (0.0062) (0.0004)
33Table 4. Simulated Second Moments of Home Variables (in %) - Only
Real Shocks
Sys. St. Dev.
z e π Y C I H NX
Fix 0.002 n.a 0.15 0.77 0.25 4.48 0.59 0.92
(0.0001) 0.002 (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.0013)
Float 0.005 0.01 0.16 0.77 0.25 4.48 0.59 0.91
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.0014)
Table 5. Simulated Second Moments of Foreign Variables (in %) -
Only Real Shocks
Sys. St. Dev
π Y C I H
Fix 0.15 1.19 0.25 5.74 0.68
(0.002) (0.0063) (0.0019) (0.0059) (0.0025)
Float 0.16 1.19 0.25 5.76 0.68
(0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0018) (0.0062) (0.0004)
34Table 6. Empirical and Simulated Correlations of Selected Variables21
Correlations Data Model
All Shocks Real Shocks
Bretton Woods Post Bretton Woods Fix Float Fix Float
ρ(z) 0.85 0.81 0.89 0.68 0.87 0.91
ρ(e) 0.81 0.85 n.a. 0.73 n.a. 0.73
ρ(z,e) 0.85 0.95 n.a. 0.90 n.a. 0.42
ρ(z,
y
y∗) 0.20 0.12 0.17 -0.02 0.49 0.40
ρ(C,C∗) 0.33 0.24 1 -0.09 1 1
ρ(Y,Y ∗) 0.18 0.45 -0.30 -0.35 -0.41 -0.41
ρ(M,M∗) 0.21 0.07 1 0.11 1 1
21The empirical data are averages over the G7 countries. M is M1 money stock; see footnote
16 for explanations about the other series. Bilateral correlations are with the U.S.
35Table 7. Ratio of Second Moment of Relative Prices Across Exchange
Rate Regimes (in %)
All Shocks Real Shocks
σ(q∗) σ(q) cov(q∗,q) σ(q∗) σ(q) cov(q∗,q)
Fix vs Float 1.14 1.04 5.66 0.95 0.98 0.93
Table 8. Volatility Ratios of First Diﬀerenced “Fundamentals” Across
Exchange Rate Regimes
Data All Shocks Real Shocks
VF 3.58 3.16 0.46∗
Flexible-price model
TF 1.19∗∗ 1.29∗∗ 0.92∗∗
Sticky-price model
TFS 1.16∗∗ 1.15∗∗ 0.70∗∗
36Figure 1a: Responses to a Home Monetary Shock
Under a Fixed and a Flexible Exchange Rate
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37Figure 1b: Responses to a Home Monetary Shock
Under a Fixed and a Flexible Exchange Rate
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38Figure 2a: Responses to a Home Real Shock
Under a Fixed and a Flexible Exchange Rate
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39Figure 2b: Responses to a Home Real Shock
Under a Fixed and a Flexible Exchange Rate
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40Figure 3: Standard Deviation of the Real Exchange Rate Relative to
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